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Introduction
Uncovering the determinants of earnings is an
important and well-researched area in labor
economics. In studies of race or sex discrimina-
tion, it is imperative to use statistical methods
that control for various factors so that the
researcher can obtain an unbiased measure of
discrimination. Another area that has attracted
interest is the interaction of wages and union
membership. Again, controlling for certain fac-
tors enhances our understanding of how unions
affect wages. Of course, knowing exactly what
to control for is at the heart of the problem. In
this paper, we examine one particular control
variable that is often used in earnings regres-
sions—an indivdual’s marital status. In analyz-
ing and interpreting the results obtained from
earnings regressions, we hope to develop a bet-
ter measure of how any policy affects (or does
not affect) individual behavior.
The wage premium attributable to marriage
has been well documented in the literature and
is typically as large as that associated with union
status. The source of this premium, however,
remains debatable. Two common explanations
of why married men earn more than unmarried
men are 1) the division of labor in a married
household allocates more of the man’s time to
the market,1 and 2) married men have a lower
cost of human capital acquisition, since a
spouse may be working to help finance the
additional human capital.2 Both of these stories
imply that marriage enhances productivity, and
therefore wages, as a result of an increase in
human capital. We suggest an alternative expla-
nation for the marriage premium, derived from
the job-matching literature, in which marriage
signals certain unobservable individual charac-
teristics that are valued by employers—includ-
ing ability, honesty, loyalty, dependability, and
n 1 As evidence that married men are relatively more market intensive,
it is often noted that they work more hours. For example, in the sample we
draw from the 1971 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Men (NLSYM), mean hours per week for married men is 44.17, versus
41.28 for unmarried men. However, after age 22, the mean hours differen-
tial drops to less than one hour per week.
n 2 Some evidence that marriage facilitates human capital acquisition
is provided by Kenny (1983), but the potential endogeneity of an individ-
ual’s marital status is ignored. Furthermore, the argument that marriage
makes it cheaper to accumulate human capital is difficult to reconcile with
the fact that men who acquire more formal education tend to marry later
than those who acquire less (Bergstrom and Schoeni [1992]). 11
determination.3 Failure to control for the corre-
lation of the fixed effects with marriage will lead
to a bias in the marital status coefficient. That is,
some of the returns attributable to marriage will
actually be returns to some unobserved qualities
correlated with marital status.
Under either of the above scenarios, marital
status should not be treated as an exogenous
determinant of the wage rate. However, it is
assumed to be exogenous in most wage re-
gressions that control for marital status, result-
ing in an estimated marriage premium that is
biased upward.
In this paper, we reexamine the empirical
relationship between marriage and wages. Our
investigation proceeds along two lines. First, to
the extent we can model the process that deter-
mines marriage, our cross-section procedures
attempt to capture the kind of incentives that
the human capital stories imply for the marriage
premium. Second, we employ panel data esti-
mation techniques that allow us to control for
unobservable individual-specific effects that
may be correlated with marital status. If we
interpret these individual effects as ability—
or as any of the qualities listed above that may
lead to better job matches — then panel data
estimation addresses a different source of endo-
geneity than that arising from the human capi-
tal arguments.
The clearest picture of the effects of mar-
riage on wages emerges in our panel estimates.
In every case where we condition on unob-
served individual effects, the estimated marital
status coefficient is essentially zero. We argue
that these results support the view of marriage
as a “signal’’ of some underlying characteristics.
Furthermore, specification tests confirm the
importance of unobserved heterogeneity and





Virtually all cross-section wage regressions that
control for marital status report a large, statisti-
cally significant wage premium for married
men. Some of the more prominent examples
are discussed by Reed and Harford (1989) and
Korenman and Neumark (1991). Our view is
that the marriage premium commonly reported
in cross-section wage regressions is largely a
statistical artifact, at least for young men. The
wage premium can be explained in terms of
unobservable individual characteristics that are
positively correlated with marriage and wages.
The characteristics that lead to “good’’ (long
and stable) marriages are the same characteris-
tics that produce “good’’ (long and stable) jobs
and higher wages. 
This view has some additional support from
another strand of the literature relating to the
returns to job tenure. Abraham and Farber
(1987) propose that workers in long-tenure jobs
earn more in every year on the job, and that
most of the cross-section return to tenure is due
to unobserved individual and job-match effects.
They test their proposition by estimating wage
equations conditional on predicted job dura-
tion. Interestingly, the results of their job dura-
tion model indicate that marriage has a large
and positive statistically significant effect. 
Further evidence exists in the quit behavior
of married men. Consistent with the positive
relationship between marriage and job duration
is the depressing effect marriage has on quits.
Shaw (1987) reports that the quit rate for mar-
ried men aged 25–54 is less than half that of
unmarried men. He also finds that marriage has
its strongest deterrent effect on the quit behav-
ior of younger men.
Only Nakosteen and Zimmer (1987) argue
explicitly that marriage does not significantly
affect wages. However, the empirical support
for their argument is weak. Using a cross-
section of 576 employed men between the ages
of 18 and 24, taken from the 1977 wave of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), they
estimate an earnings equation in which mar-
riage is modeled as a treatment effect, thereby
making marital status endogenous.4 When they
restrict marital status to be exogenous and apply
ordinary least squares (OLS) to their wage equa-
tion, Nakosteen and Zimmer obtain a statistical-
ly significant marital status coefficient estimate
of 0.370. Relaxing the exogeneity restriction
actually causes this coefficient estimate to rise,
although it is no longer statistically significant.
Furthermore, specification tests of exogeneity
are inconclusive. Nevertheless, Nakosteen and
Zimmer find that the true marriage premium is
not significantly different from zero.
n 3 Reed and Harford (1989) provide another alternative—that the
marriage premium represents a compensating differential required to in-
duce married men to accept “undesirable’’ working conditions. In their
view, marriage is related to the purchase of costly “family goods’’ such 
as children.
n 4 See Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980) for an explanation of
treatment effect models.12
Korenman and Neumark, whose results are
based on the 1976, 1978, and 1980 waves of
the NLSYM, take the opposite stance. They
claim that the gains to marriage are large for
young (white) men, even after controlling for
unobserved heterogeneity. In their preferred
specification, years married and its square are
included in the wage equation, along with the
marital status dummy. Marriage premiums are
derived from both cross-section and fixed
effects (“within’’) estimates. The marriage pre-
mium at mean years married, calculated from
the fixed effects estimates, is 15 percent, which
is about 20 percent smaller than the premium
yielded by their cross-section estimates.
However, the large gains to marriage re-
ported by Korenman and Neumark may be mis-
leading. First, only the estimated years-married
coefficients are statistically significant. This is
true in both their cross-section and fixed effects
regressions. Thus, more than one-fifth of these
premiums are due to shift-parameter estimates
that are not significantly different from zero.
Second, when we include years married and
its square along with tenure and its square in
our sample, the former never enters statistically
significantly, while the latter always does.
Because married men hold longer jobs (experi-
ence less turnover), years married may be play-
ing a role similar to tenure in the Korenman/
Neumark regressions.
Third, Korenman and Neumark’s results
suggest that each additional year of marriage
translates into a 1 to 2 percent wage gain. As
indicated by Bergstrom and Schoeni (1992),
this implies that men who married at age 17
should earn 10 to 20 percent more at age 40
than men who married at age 27, all else equal.
However, their results show that, controlling
for current age, men who married at 17 make
25 percent less on average than men who mar-
ried at 27.5 Finally, Cornwell and Rupert (1996)
demonstrate that adding another year (1971) to
the Korenman/Neumark sample changes the
results substantially. This change can be attrib-
uted to the fact that most of the marital status
changes in their sample represent individuals




Our econometric methodology addresses the
possibility of marital status endogeneity in a
variety of ways. Each of the techniques has
shortcomings as well as merits. Therefore, we
cover a wide range of procedures and attempt
to derive a consensus regarding the contribu-
tion of marital status to earnings.
We begin with a general model of wage
determination for married (M) and single (S)
men, where the wage-generating process is ini-
tially assumed to be different for each type:7
(1)
(2)
where i indexes individuals (i = 1, ... , N ) and 
t indexes time periods (t = 1, ... T ), yit is the
natural logarithm of the real wage, Xit is a vec-
tor of explanatory variables, and the uit’s are
disturbances with time-invariant and time-
varying components, expressed as 
(3)
(4)
The ai’s, which vary over individuals but not
over time, capture unobserved, individual-
specific attributes that may be valued in both
the labor and marriage markets. The eit’s,
which vary over individuals and time, reflect
aspects of the wage-determining process that
can be represented as statistical noise.
In our sample, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis that bM = bS.8 Thus, we express the
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n 5 Bergstrom and Schoeni point out that to reconcile these results,
one would have to argue that if men who married at 27 had married at 17,
they would have earned 35 to 40 percent more per year than men who
actually did marry at 17.
n 6 By appending the additional (earlier) year to the Korenman/ 
Neumark data set, we can look at the earnings of younger men or, more
specifically, at the earnings of men who have never been married. The evi-
dence suggests that to the extent there is a gain to marital status, it is purely
an intercept shift, with no additional effect attributed to the number of years
married.
n 7 Our approach is similar to that employed by Robinson (1989) in
his analysis of union wage effects.
n 8 The value of theF-statistic from a comparison of regressions of
married and single men over the two periods covered in our data set is
only 0.75, and the 95 percent critical value is about 2.8.13
If the correlation between marriage and the
error term is zero (that is, E[Mithit] = 0), then
treating (5) as a standard cross-section wage
regression and estimating by OLS produces a
consistent estimate of the marriage premium, 
(dM – dS). However, for reasons outlined in the
previous section, this is not likely to be the
case. Thus, in general, the marriage premium
cannot be identified by OLS.
Since Mit is unlikely to be orthogonal to 
hit, identification of the marriage premium is
problematic. The difficulty is that the wage dif-
ferential comprises two terms: (dM – dS ) and 
(uM
it – u S
it ). The first term is fixed and the same
for all men. If men are randomly distributed
across married and single states, then this term
represents the true wage premium. Even if
assignment across married and single states is
random, however, standard cross-section esti-
mation may still be inappropriate. If the source
of endogeneity of Mit is unobserved individual
attributes that are valued by employers as well
as potential marriage partners, then consistent
estimation would imply conditioning on the
ai’s. Panel data are important in this regard, a
point that we elaborate on below.
If assignment to the married and single states
is not random, then identification of the true
wage premium is complicated by the second
term, (uM
it – uS
it). In this case, the expected
increase in the wage rate as a result of marriage
is (dM – dS ) +  E[(uM
it –  uS
it)|Mit  = 1]. Separate
identification of (dM – dS ) requires additional
restrictions on our model so that the process
generating marital status can be parameterized.
The restrictions may involve orthogonality con-
ditions that define a set of exogenous variables
for marital status, or distributional assumptions
like bivariate normality of yit and Mit. The valid-
ity of such restrictions is an empirical question.
Imposing them when they are empirically in-
valid is a misspecification, the statistical conse-
quences of which may be less acceptable than




We consider three different approaches to esti-
mating the effect of marriage on wages: instru-
mental variables (IV), the inverse Mills ratio
(IMR) method, and methods that exploit the
availability of panel data. Each approach
imposes a different set of restrictions on the
model. The choice of which approach to use is
determined largely by whether the restrictions
can be justified.
The appeal of both the IV and IMR methods
hinges on the ability to specify the process gov-
erning marital status.9 Let the reduced form for
this process be expressed as
(7)
where M *   it is a latent index representing the
net gain to marriage, Zit is a vector of explana-
tory variables that includes Xit, and vit is a zero
mean disturbance with variance s2
v . We ob-
serve only a discrete realization of Mit *, which
we define as the dummy variable Mit. Note that
Mit = 1 if Mit *.0, and Mit = 0 if Mit * # 0.
Instrumental
Variables
The IV procedure exploits the orthogonality
condition
(8)
where Zit contains at least one regressor not in
Xit, and g is some known transformation of Zit.
The set of restrictions in (8) are used in (7) to
construct an instrumental variable for Mit that
has been purged of correlation with hit. No
distributional assumption about the vit’s is nec-
essary, although one may be imposed. For ex-
ample, if the vit’s are independently and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) standard normal and are
independent of Zit, then (7) can be estimated
by probit maximum likelihood. The resulting
instrument for Mit would be  ˆ Mit = F (–Zit ¢ ˆ g),
where F is the standard normal cumulative dis-
tribution function. In any case, the instrumental
variable is inserted in a least squares regression
of yit on (Xit,  ˆ Mit), and the estimated coefficient
of ˆ Mit is taken to be the measure of the effect
of marriage on wages. However, if the condition
in (8) is violated, the IV estimate of the marriage
premium will not be consistent. Assuming (8)
holds, the IV estimator provides a natural con-
trast to OLS, thereby providing a Wu–Hausman-
type test of the exogeneity of marital status (see
Wu [1973] and Hausman [1978]).
E [g(Zit)hit] 5 0, 
M* it 5 Z¢ itg 1 vit,




The IMR method addresses the endogeneity of
marital status in the context of the nonlinear
regression function
(9) E(yit|Zit, Mit) 5 dS 1 Xit ¢b 1 (dM – dS)Mit
1 jh(Zit, Mit; g), 
where
(10) h(Zit,M it;g) 5 MitE(hit| Zit, Mit 5 1) 
1 (1– Mit)E(hit| Zit,M it5 0),
j =shv /s2
v, and shv  = cov(h, v). Note that h
comprises the relevant inverse Mills ratios. If
the vit’s are assumed to be i.i.d. standard nor-
mal, then the inverse Mills ratios are, respec-
tively, j/F and –j/(1 – F), where j is the stan-
dard normal probability density function, and
both j and F are evaluated at –Z ¢ itg.
This method is designed to correct for the
self-selection of individuals into marriage; that
is, it accounts for whether there is something
different about individuals who marry versus
those who do not. Estimation of (9) can be ac-
complished through a simple two-step proce-
dure. First, probit maximum likelihood is ap-
plied to (7) to obtain an estimate of g, which is
used to construct  ˆ h (Zit,Mit; ˆ g). Then, ˆ h is sub-
stituted for h in (9), and the resulting regression
is estimated by least squares.10 The statistical
significance of  ˆ h in this regression provides
another test of the exogeneity of marital status. 
Consistency of the IMR method also de-
pends on whether (8) is satisfied, as well as on
knowledge of the functional form of h.I n  
a given empirical application, the IMR method
may not be robust to departure from the
functional-form assumption (say, normality).
Another problem is that the inverse Mills ratios
may simply be proxying for omitted nonlinear-
ities, in which case interpretation as a correc-
tion for self-selection becomes difficult.
Panel Data
With panel data, alternative estimators to the
cross-section approaches of IV and IMR exist.
For convenience, assume that uit
M = uit
S i.
This will have no adverse statistical conse-
quences if 1) men have only the same knowl-
edge as the econometrician regarding their eit’s,
but have exclusive knowledge of their ai’s, and
2) men’s unobservable characteristics have the
same impact on wages regardless of whether
an individual is married or single (Robinson
[1989]). Then, (6) becomes
(11) yit 5 dS 1 Xit ¢ b 1 (dM – dS)Mit 1 ai 1eit.
Finally, assume that the ai’s and eit’s are i.i.d.
random variables, uncorrelated with each




In a standard human capital wage equation,
it is likely that E(X ¢ itai)Þ0, since Xit typically
contains measures of education, work experi-
ence, and job tenure that are correlated with
unobserved ability reflected in the ai’s. Further-
more, because men with large amounts of
human capital are more attractive as potential
spouses, it is likely that Xit and Mit are corre-
lated. Hence, attempts to estimate the effect of
marriage on wages should go beyond correc-
tion for self-selection per se.
The “Within”
Estimator
The simplest procedure for consistently estimat-
ing (11) is the so-called within estimator, which
is calculated by applying least squares to data
that have been transformed into deviations
from individual means. Since the ai’s are
treated as fixed parameters, the within estima-
tor is consistent regardless of the relationship
between (X ¢ it, Mit) and ai. Alternatively, the
within estimator can be viewed as an instru-
mental variables estimator, with the instruments
being the deviations from the means, which are
orthogonal to the ai’s by construction.
Of course, if the ai’s are uncorrelated with
(X¢ it, Mit), more efficient estimation of (11) is
possible via generalized least squares (GLS).
Like the within estimator, GLS can also be com-
puted from a least squares regression on trans-
formed data. In this case, the transformation is
to  “whiten’’ the errors.11 Another advantage of
panel data is that this proposition can be tested.
The efficiency of GLS under the null hypothesis
n 10 Other estimation strategies include direct nonlinear least squares
estimation of (9) and maximum likelihood. To estimate by maximum likeli-
hood, one must be willing to assume that (h, n) is distributed bivariate
normal. See Barnow, Cain, and Goldberger (1980) and Heckman and Robb
(1985) for details.
n 11 This transformation follows from Fuller and Battese (1973) and





that E[(X¢ it, Mit)ai] = 0, along with the robust-
ness of the within estimator to departures from
the null, form the basis of a Wu–Hausman test
of the difference between the GLS and within
estimates of (11). 
The Hausman–
Taylor Estimator
A consistent and potentially more efficient alter-
native to the within estimator is Hausman and
Taylor’s (1981) efficient instrumental variables
procedure (HT-IV).12 HT-IV exploits knowl-
edge of the uncorrelatedness of certain col-
umns of X¢ it with ai to increase the instrument
set beyond that of the within estimator.13 Com-
putation involves an IV regression on the same
data transformation required for GLS. Thus, 
the efficiency gains to HT-IV come from an ex-
panded instrument set and whitened errors.
More efficient estimation of the parameters
of (11) is one motivation for considering HT-IV.
Another is that HT-IV permits a direct test of
the uncorrelatedness of Mit with ai. The GLS/
within contrast does not indicate which explan-
atory variables are correlated with the effects if
the null is rejected. However, using a Wu–
Hausman test of the difference between HT-IV
estimates that maintain a legitimate set of over-
identifying restrictions with HT-IV estimates that
take Mit to be exogenous, we can determine
whether marital status is in fact exogenous.
Note that both the within and HT-IV estima-
tors are distinguished from the cross-section pro-
cedures, which depend on over-identifying
restrictions like those defined in (8) and/or on
special distributional assumptions. In addition,
within and HT-IV allow consideration of another
source of nonidentifiability of the marriage pre-
mium that is not addressed by the cross-section
approaches, namely, correlation between 
Xit and the effects. Consistent estimation of 
(dM – dS) is not possible if E(X¢ itai) Þ 0, unless
Xit is orthogonal to Mit, even if E(Mit ai) = 0.
III. Estimation of the
Marriage Premium
Data
Our data are drawn from the 1971 and 1976
waves of the NLSYM. The primary advantage of
the NLSYM is that it allows us to follow individ-
uals moving from the single (and not previ-
ously married) to the married state. Between
1971 and 1976, roughly 23 percent of the
young men in our sample went from never
married to married, while only about 5 percent
were divorced or separated. The 1971 cross-
section data set consists of 1,073 young men
who were between the ages of 19 and 29 in
1971 and who worked more than 40 weeks
during the year. Our panel is constructed from
the individuals in the cross-section data set who
are also observed in 1976. Attrition reduces the
number of observations in both periods to 860,
of which about 15 percent are black.
In addition to marital status, we observe (in
both years) each man’s wage, age (AGE), years
n 12 Extensions of this procedure to broader classes of instrument
sets can be found in Amemiya and MaCurdy (1986) and Breusch, Mizon,
and Schmidt (1989).
n 13 HT-IV uses the individual means and deviations from means of
each time-varying exogenous variable inXit as separate instruments (see




Variable Section Panel Panel
LOG REAL WAGE 1.122 1.179 1.399
(0.438) (0.437) (0.414)
MARITAL STATUS 0.718 0.716 0.895
(0.450) (0.451) (0.306)
AGE 23.96 24.00 29.00
(3.18) (3.18) (3.18)
TENURE 3.209 3.321 6.197
(2.532) (2.551) (4.032)
UNION 0.314 0.326 0.342
(0.464) (0.469) (0.475)
SOUTH 0.360 0.367 0.379
(0.480) (0.482) (0.485)
SMSA 0.679 0.687 0.688
(0.467) (0.464) (0.463)
EDUCATION 12.738 12.802 13.321
(2.519) (2.467) (2.620)
RACE 0.141 0.149 0.149
(0.348) (0.356) (0.356)
No. of observations 1,073 860 860
Never Married Married to
Marital Status Changers to Married Not Married
Frequency 197 43
Percent of observations 22.9 5.0
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men.
Means and Standard Deviations 
by Year, and Percent of Sample
Changing Marital Status16
of tenure with his employer (TENURE), years of
education (EDUCATION), union status (UNION
= 1 if a union member), race (RACE = 1 if
black), and residence (SOUTH = 1 if resident of
the South; SMSA = 1 if resident of a Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area).14 The variable
MARITAL STATUS has a value of 1 if the individ-
ual is married and living with his spouse, and
zero otherwise. Table 1 provides the means and
standard deviations for the variables in our sam-
ples, and documents the percentage of men
who change their marital status.
Results
First, we estimate our model using purely cross-
sectional methods. In each case, Xit contains
the explanatory variables AGE, AGE2, UNION,
SOUTH, SMSA, EDUCATION, and RACE. The
dependent variable in every regression is the
natural logarithm of the real wage. The results
of cross-section estimation are presented in
table 2. The OLS estimates, given in the first
column, serve as a baseline for comparing esti-
mates obtained from procedures that allow for
marital status endogeneity.
In general, the results of our OLS regressions
are typical of those found elsewhere in the liter-
ature. Of interest here is the coefficient of mari-
tal status, which is estimated to be 0.054 with a
standard error of 0.025 (statistically significant at
the 5 percent level). We have argued that the
marriage premium estimated by OLS is biased
upward due to the endogeneity of marital sta-
tus. A Wu–Hausman test of the exogeneity of
marital status can be performed by comparing
OLS and IV estimates of our model.
To construct an instrument for Mit, we need
an empirical specification of the decision rule
that determines marriage (equation [7]); that is,
a regressor (or set of regressors) that is not in-
cluded in Xit. From the NLSYM, we obtain two
family-background variables for this purpose:
number of siblings (NSIB) and years of educa-
tion of the father (FED). The Wu–Hausman test
amounts to a test of significance of  ˆ Mit in a
regression of yit on (X¢ it, Mit,  ˆ Mit). We conduct
the test using a  ˆ Mit calculated from both OLS
and probit maximum likelihood estimates of g.
The p-values of the test statistics for the null
hypothesis that the coefficient of ˆ Mit equals
zero are 0.089 and 0.108, respectively. Taken
together, these tests provide weak evidence
against the exogeneity of marital status.
Instrumental
Variables
Assuming that marital status is endogenous, we
turn to the IV estimates of our model, which are
presented in the second and third columns of
table 2. The results in the IV1 column are based
on a ˆ Mit obtained by OLS, while those in the
IV2 column are based on a ˆ Mit derived from
probit maximum likelihood. In both cases, we
fail to reject, even at a 10 percent level of sig-
nificance, the null hypothesis that the estimated
marital status coefficient is zero. Moreover, both
IV marital status coefficient estimates are less
than zero and are large in absolute value.
Consistency of these IV estimates depends
on the validity of the over-identifying restric-
tions exploited in the construction of  ˆ Mit. A
test of the over-identifying restrictions exam-
ines whether (NSIB, FED) jointly adds to the
TABLE 2
n 14 The wage-rate variable provided by the NLSYM is the hourly
wage for hourly workers and salary/usual hours for salaried workers.  Our
wage-rate variable is deflated by the Consumer Price Index and is
expressed in 1970 dollars.
OLS IV1 IV2 IMR
CONSTANT –2.156 –5.381 –4.858 –3.835
(0.697) (2.721) (2.278) (1.330)
MARITAL STATUS 0.054 –0.691 –0.570 –0.334
(0.025) (0.554) (0.488) (0.253)
AGE 0.188 0.471 0.425 0.335
(0.059) (0.238) (0.199) (0.115)
AGE2 –0.003 –0.008 –0.007 –0.006
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
UNION 0.214 0.223 0.221 0.219
(0.023) (0.032) (0.030) (0.026)
SOUTH –0.122 –0.095 –0.100 –0.108
(0.024) (0.038) (0.035) (0.028)
SMSA 0.157 0.156 0.156 0.156
(0.023) (0.030) (0.028) (0.025)
EDUCATION 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.029
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
RACE –0.169 –0.287 –0.268 –0.231
(0.033) (0.103) (0.087) (0.053)
h 0.196
(0.149)
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. 
Cross-Section Marital Status 
Premiums from the 1971 NLSYM17
predictive power of our model. The value of
the test statistic, which is distributed as F 3,992,
is 2.337. Hence, the restrictions cannot be re-
jected at the 5 percent level of significance. On
the other hand, the p-value of the F-statistic is
only 0.949, and only NSIB (aside from certain
variables in Xit) enters (7) statistically signifi-
cantly. This may be part of the reason that,
using our IV procedures, we are unable to
arrive at any stronger conclusions about the




As an alternative to IV, we estimate our model
using the two-step IMR procedure. First, we
estimate (7) by probit maximum likelihood to
obtain an estimate of g. This estimate is then
used to form the estimates of the relevant IMR
terms that comprise h in (10). Second, we
apply OLS to (9), where ˆ h is substituted for h.
The results of this two-step procedure are given
in the fourth column of table 2. The marital sta-
tus coefficient estimate is –0.334 and, like the
IV estimates, is not statistically significant. Fur-
thermore, the “selection term,’’ ˆ h, does not
enter the regression statistically significantly,
thereby providing no (additional) evidence of
the endogeneity of marital status.16
In sum, cross-sectional approaches to the
identification of the marriage premium yield no
definitive conclusions. The evidence against the
exogeneity of marital status is relatively weak.
When marital status is treated as endogenous,
the resulting coefficient estimates are large and
negative. Moreover, when the estimated marital
status coefficient is large in absolute value, the
fact that it is not statistically different from zero
may have little meaning.
Next, we consider estimation techniques that
exploit the availability of panel data.
Panel Data
We proceed under the assumptions of (11) and
focus on the role of unobservable individual-
specific characteristics in estimating the return
to marriage. The advantage of panel data is the
ability to control for such characteristics, which
may be correlated with (X ¢ it,Mit). Consequently,
we can address another likely source of non-
identifiability of the marriage premium, namely,
the potential correlation of Xit with the effects.
Furthermore, our panel data procedures do not
require the data to satisfy orthogonality condi-
tions such as those in (8), or to meet any spe-
cial distributional assumptions. This is impor-
tant, since the cross-section estimates appear to
be sensitive to these kinds of restrictions.
Under the null hypothesis that the explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with the effects,
OLS applied to the individual means of the
variables (the so-called between estimator)
yields consistent estimates of all the coefficients
in our model. Conditional on Xit as defined
above, we estimate our model with our panel
data set using the between estimator as a basis
for comparison with procedures that are consis-
tent under the alternative hypothesis.
The between estimates, which exploit only
the cross-section dimension of the panel, are
presented in the first two columns of table 3.
Like the OLS estimates in table 2, they are typi-
cal of cross-section estimates derived from
human capital wage equations. 
Focusing on the returns to marriage, the first
column reports a statistically significant mar-
riage premium of 7 percent. However, the
regression associated with the first column does
not condition on tenure. When TENURE and
TENURE2 are included, the estimated MARITAL
STATUS coefficient declines by one-third and is
no longer statistically significant. At the same
time, the estimated returns to tenure are sizable.
This pattern is repeated in Korenman and
Neumark when they introduce years married to
their regressions. But if Abraham and Farber
are correct, tenure and years married simply
capture individual characteristics that lead to
longer-lasting and higher-wage jobs.
This might be expected given the evidence
cited in Abraham and Farber (1987) on the
relationship between marital status and job
duration (completed tenure). Table 4 presents
further evidence on this relationship from our
cross-section data set. Here, we report the
results obtained from estimating an exponen-
tial hazard of job duration (correcting for right-
censoring) conditional on MARITAL STATUS,
AGE, AGE2, UNION, BLUE COLLAR (= 1 if the
individual is employed in a blue-collar occupa-
tion), EDUCATION, and RACE. Other than the
effect of union membership, marriage has the
largest positive impact on job duration.
n 15 The instrument set (NSIB, FED) represents our best attempt,
using our 1971 NLSYM cross-section sample, at a specification of (7).
n 16 We also estimated (9) by maximum likelihood, which assumes
(hit,  nit) to be bivariate normal.  The maximum likelihood estimate of 
(dM– dS)  is 0.032 with a standard error of 0.033, so it is not statistically
significant.  In addition, the correlation coefficient rhv is only –0.117 and
is also not statistically significant.  18
Within Estimates
The between estimates are consistent only if
(X¢ it, Mit) is orthogonal to the effects. The within
estimates, given in the third column of table 3,
are consistent regardless of whether the effects
are correlated with the explanatory variables.
Our within regression yields an estimated mar-
riage premium that is essentially zero. The MAR-
ITAL STATUS coefficient estimate is –0.012 with
a standard error of 0.025. Conditioning on un-
observed heterogeneity has a similar effect on
the return to tenure, as the estimated TENURE
coefficient declines from 0.055 to 0.015. One
interpretation of these results, consistent with
Abraham and Farber, is that the cross-section
gains to marriage and tenure largely reflect
unobserved individual characteristics that are
valued by the firm.
The outcomes of two specification tests sup-
port this interpretation. First, the assumption of
the between regressions that (X ¢ it, Mit)i s
orthogonal to the effects is soundly rejected. A
Hausman test of the difference in the between
and within estimates yields a test statistic that is
asymptotically distributed as c2
9 and that has a
value of 34.770. The interpretation of the test
statistic is as follows: The within estimates are
consistent under the null or alternative hypoth-
esis, while the between estimates are consistent
only if there is no correlation between (X¢ it,Mit)
and ai, implying that the estimates should be
somewhat close if no correlation exists. How-
ever, the statistic reported above shows that the
estimates are quite far apart, leading us to reject
the assumption of no correlation. 
Hausman–Taylor 
Estimates
While the Hausman test demonstrates the gen-
eral importance of unobserved heterogeneity in
our model, it does not specifically address the
uncorrelatedness of Mit with ai. This is accom-
plished by appealing to the HT-IV estimator of
Hausman and Taylor (1981). Efficiency gains
over the within estimator are obtained by ex-
ploiting information about the uncorrelatedness
of certain columns of X ¢ it with ai and account-
ing for the variance components. The null
hypothesis that Mit is orthogonal to ai can be
tested by comparing HT-IV estimates derived
from a legitimate set of over-identifying restric-
tions with HT-IV estimates computed assuming
Mit is exogenous.
Hausman tests contrasting HT-IV and within
estimates reveal that a legitimate instrument can
TABLE 3
Between Between Within HT–IV
CONSTANT –1.908 –1.851 –0.968
(0.809) (0.794) (0.161)
MARITAL STATUS 0.070 0.0461 –0.012 –0.017
(0.037) (0.036) (0.025) (0.024)
AGE 0.150 0.141 0.118 0.124
(0.062) (0.061) (0.022) (0.021)
AGE2 0.002 –0.002 –0.002 –0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
TENURE 0.055 0.015 0.013
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007)
TENURE2 –0.003 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
UNION 0.162 0.142 0.190 0.181
(0.025) (0.025) (0.027) (0.020)
SOUTH –0.093 –0.084 –0.058 –0.082
(0.023) (0.023) (0.056) (0.022)
SMSA 0.198 0.197 0.070 0.158
(0.023) (0.023) (0.041) (0.021)
EDUCATION 0.040 0.041 0.045 0.054
(0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.012)
RACE –0.203 –0.202 –0.193
(0.031) (0.030) (0.035)
x2 34.770 8.030
NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men. 
Estimated Marital Status 













No. of observations 1,073




be constructed by assuming that AGE, AGE2,
UNION, SOUTH, SMSA, and RACE are uncorre-
lated with the ai’s. This result comes from the
fact that the within estimator is consistent
regardless of the correlation of the ai’s with the
above variables, while the HT-IV’s are not.
Therefore, if the results are close in some sense
(as defined by a Hausman test, for example),
that would lead to the acceptance of the vari-
ables being uncorrelated with the ai’s. The test
statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as
c2
5, has a value of 8.03, which is well within the
95 percent statistic of 12.8. The HT-IV estimates
based on this instrument set are presented in
the last column of table 3. In general, they cor-
roborate the results from within estimation. The
estimated marital status coefficient is again very
small and statistically insignificant. The HT-IV
tenure coefficient estimate is 0.013, quite close
to the within estimate.
A Hausman test of the difference between
the HT-IV estimates in the last column of table
3 and those obtained from HT-IV estimation
with marital status added to the instrument set
rejects the exogeneity of marital status. The test
statistic equals 3.89 and is asymptotically dis-
tributed as c2
1 with a p-value of 0.048. 
IV. Conclusion
We use cross-section and panel data estimation
procedures to determine the effect of marriage
on the wages of a sample of young men drawn
from the NLSYM. Whenever we control for
unobservable individual effects, the estimated
returns to marriage are virtually zero. In addi-
tion, specification tests reject the hypothesis that
marital status is uncorrelated with the effects.
We conclude that the usual cross-section mar-
riage premium is essentially a statistical artifact,
at least for young men. Within the job-matching
literature, this conclusion has a reasonable inter-
pretation: As an explanatory variable in human
capital wage equations, marital status appears to
fulfill a role similar to that of tenure, namely,
proxying for unobservable individual-specific
characteristics that are valued by the firm.
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